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ABSTRACT: This presentation seeks to understand informal logic as a set of methods for the logical evaluation of 
natural language arguments.  Some of the methods identified are the fallacies method, deductivism, warrantism and 
argument schemes. A framework for comparing the adequacy of the methods is outlined consisting of the following 
categories: learner- and user-efficiency, subjective and objective reliability, and scope.  Within this framework, it is 
also possible to compare informal and formal logic. 
KEYWORDS: logic, illative evaluation, conceptual standard, operational standard, methods, reliability, 
efficiency, scope 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you have received a grant to study the argumentation surrounding a topic of 
current interest, the arguments about whether there should be unrestricted building of 
energy-producing windmills, for example, or whether your country should be involved in 
an overseas war, or whether we should eat genetically modified foods. You want to know 
all the different arguments that have been given on this topic, for and against, over a giv-
en period of time in such-and-such sources (these newspapers, these web-sites, those ra-
dio programmes). Not only do you want to know what arguments have been given, you 
also want to know which ones are good arguments and which ones are not good. But you 
can’t do all this work yourself. You need others to help you.  
 Enter at this point: the graduate students. One of them is writing a thesis on Kier-
kegaard, another on the concept of social justice, and the third on the private-language 
argument. Being graduate students there can be no doubt about their intelligence and 
commitment; however, none of these students has had any special training or background 
in the analysis or evaluation of natural language arguments. So, since the Dean has told 
you that these are the helpers you must use if you want your grant, you now have a practi-
cal problem: how do you prepare these people to help you with your research? 
 
We can use this fiction as a way of motivating and orienting a discussion about one of the 
practical problems that arise in connection with the evaluation of natural language argu-
ments, namely, how to determine their logical strength. Pursuing this problem will invite 
a comparison between formal and informal logic. Which of these two approaches is best 
for evaluating the logical strength of natural language arguments (NLA’s)? The claim has 
been urged that informal logic is best suited to the job or that it is at least just as well 
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suited to it as formal logic is. That may well be so, but how are we to decide?  What 
would justify our answer that the one approach is better than the other?   Below, a 
framework is developed that will give us some guidance in answering these questions.  
 The concept of ‘logical evaluation’ is ambiguous because some people use it 
broadly to mean the logical evaluation of arguments, including an evaluation of the prem-
ises, whereas others use ‘logical evaluation’ narrowly to refer only to the evaluation of 
the premiss-conclusion relationship, that is, to the evaluation of the extent to which prem-
ises are sufficient for their conclusions (on the assumption the premises are acceptable). 
To avoid confusion, I use the term illative evaluation to refer to the evaluation of the 
premiss-conclusion relationship in an argument or inference. The general problems that 
concerns us, then, is, how to determine the illative strength of arguments, and how to 
justify our illative judgments? The practical and more immediate problem facing us is to 
decide on a serviceable method of illative evaluation that will be easy for our  new-found 
assistants to learn and enable them to report back in fairly short order on the illative 
strength of the arguments they are studying. 
2. IN PRAISE OF FORMAL LOGIC 
The virtues of formal logic are many. One of them is that formal logic focuses on the 
premise-conclusion relation in exclusion to the question of premiss acceptability. True, 
formal logic texts introduce the concept of a sound argument as one which is deductively 
valid and has true premises. But the introduction of this concept usually comes at the 
point where the author(s) wants to distinguish logical pursuits from extra-logical ones. 
The truth is that formal logic doesn’t have much to say about premiss questions except to 
offer a broad three-fold classification which sorts them into necessarily true propositions 
(logical truths), necessarily false propositions (logical falsehoods) and contingent propo-
sitions. The first two kinds of propositions are of interest to formal logicians and philoso-
phers and mathematicians (the premises (axioms) of formal systems must be logical 
truths) but they are hardly of interest to anyone else since the premises of NLA’s are for 
the most part made of contingent propositions. Formal logic has no means of evaluating 
contingent propositions as true or false, and that is why formal-logic texts do not have 
exercises on determining the truth or falsity of such propositions. Hence, formal logic is 
aware that it cannot take it as part of its business, in general, to pronounce on premiss 
acceptability, and that therefore its true concern must be with illative issues. This is not to 
say that formal logicians do not have views about premiss acceptability; most likely they 
all do, but those views are not part of the formal logic they espouse: they are something 
else, tacked on. This may explain why at least since the nineteenth century, the preference 
is to identify logic with the study and evaluation of premises-conclusion relations and 
disassociate it from premissary questions. ‘[T]he rules of Logic,’ wrote Whately in the 
1820’s, ‘have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the Premises; except, of course, 
when they are the conclusions of former arguments’ (Whately 1875: 153), and about 175 
years later we have Skyrms expressing almost the same view when he writes that, except 
in special cases, ‘It is not the business of a logician to judge whether the premises of an 
argument are true or false’ (Skyrms 2000: 15).21 
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 Many informal logicians take the practical task of their discipline to be the eval-
uation of arguments, and hence they include both premissary and illative questions in 
informal logic. But questions of premiss evaluation must be shared with colleagues in 
epistemology, philosophy of science, politics, history, economics, rhetoric and dialectical 
studies, colleagues who have premissary standards and means for evaluating premises, 
and are thus in a much better position to say whether a given premiss is acceptable than a 
logician would be. My point here is that although informal logicians have been among 
those who have urged that the standard for premises must be acceptability rather than 
truth, informal logic has hardly any means of determining whether premises meet the 
standard of acceptability. Thus, with regards to premissary questions, informal logicians 
are not in a much better position than that of formal logicians.  Judgments about premises 
must ultimately be made by experts in other fields or by informal logicians in the guise of 
being experts in other fields. Conversely, the experts about premiss acceptability in other 
fields do not make a special study of how to evaluate illative relations. I do not mean that 
they are not discriminating in their illative judgments. They work with the standards im-
plicit in thier fields, but they make no specialty of the study illative goodness. According-
ly, my preference is to use ‘informal logic’ in a narrow sense, parallelling that of the 
range of formal logic, such that it is concerned only with illative issues.  
 Narrowing informal logic in the way that I propose does not diminish the im-
portance of argument evaluation. Argument evaluation is the larger enterprise that gives 
significance to the less encompassing field of illative evaluation. But by narrowing in-
formal logic to deal only with illative issues we not only have the benefit of distancing 
ourselves from a variety of approaches to argument evaluation (rhetorical and dialectical 
approaches, for instance) and setting up a unique area of study, we also prepare the 
ground for a comparison with formal logic that puts both parties on equal footing. 
 Let us now consider another of the virtues of formal logic. Not only does formal 
logic value conceptual clarity (the basic concepts are few and well-defined), it is devoted 
to methods of illative evaluation, to making them perspicuous and transparent. Different 
methods have been identified and detailed: the truth-table method, for example, the truth-
tree method, normal forms methods, the Venn and Euler methods, natural deduction 
method, etc. (see Quine 1982). All these methods share the same conceptual standard of 
illative goodness. It is deductive validity. Judgments about formal validity, however, are 
seldom made by direct appeal to the conceptual standard, but rather by testing the argu-
ment against some operational standard. Truth-table validity is one such operational 
standard, and each of the methods of formal logic has its own operational standard in the 
service of the conceptual standard. The various methods of formal logic (used for testing 
for validity) are really methods for determining whether an argument satisfies an opera-
tional standard of illative goodness. The truth-table method consists of an operational 
standard (there should be all T’s in the final column), a set of concepts (e.g. the defini-
tions of the truth-functional constants, etc.) and a set of techniques (e.g., how to construct 
a truth table, how to compute the value of the final column, etc). Employing the tech-
niques constitutes a test for seeing whether the operational standard has been satisfied. If 
the operational standard is satisfied, so is the conceptual standard. 
 (There are many illative methods of formal logic but in what follows the truth-
table method will serve as the method of formal logic for the sake of making the compar-
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ison with informal logic. The same points of differences and similarities could be made as 
well with any of the other formal logic methods.
3
) 
 The formal-logic method of illative evaluation of NLA’s is attractive for several 
reasons. One of these is that it can help us decide hard cases, i.e., those which are near the 
edge of or beyond our intuitive competence. Most of all, however, formal methods are 
intertwined with a satisfying answer to the question, ‘What makes an argument logically 
good?’ Postulating logical form as the source of illative goodness is in line with our phil-
osophical urge to seek the real truth behind surface appearances, the deep structures that 
underlie the surface grammar of arguments. Thus, taking the natural language arguments 
(NLA’s), transforming them into formal language arguments (FLA’s), making illative 
evaluations of the FLA’s by one of the methods of formal logic, and then extending our 
findings to the original NLA’s, seems like a good method. But this way of illatively eval-
uating NLA’s has come under criticism. For one thing, formal logic requires a lot of 
learning; maybe six-months to a year to get comfortable with the predicate calculus and 
its modal extensions. Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to find the right FLA equivalent 
to an NLA. Furthermore, it may be that the illative strength of some NLA’s just can’t be 
captured in a corresponding FLA, resulting in the disadvantage that the argument must 
remain unevaluated. There is also the problem that the formal logic we have is meant for 
arguments that are to be measured by the deductive standard, but it is generally recog-
nized that not all arguments are like that; some of them are more reasonably evaluated by, 
say, an inductive standard of illative strength. Finally, because formal logic can only give 
us a verdict of ‘valid’ or ‘invalid’, using formal logic we cannot ever arrive at intermedi-
ate judgments of illative strength: no judgments like ‘pretty good, but could be better’ are 
possible, yet, intuitively, that seems to be the appropriate thing to say about the illative 
strength of many NLA’s. Given these problems (and others not mentioned here) we can 
see that although there is much to appreciate about formal logic, there are also some rea-
sons to be dissatisfied with it as a way to make illative evaluations of NLA’s—reasons 
enough to consider alternatives. 
4. ARE THERE METHODS OF INFORMAL LOGIC? 
If illative evaluation is what is wanted and formal logic has significant shortcomings, 
then we may consider an alternative, informal logic, for instance. Informal logic attempts 
to do what formal logic can do but without relying on logical forms. We are thus led to 
wonder whether there are methods of illative evaluation for NLA’s that eschew a reliance 
on logical form. In The Logic of Real Arguments (1988), Alec Fisher suggests that there 
might be. In this paragraph, which nicely summarizes Fisher’s goals, the word ‘method’ 
occurs five times.  
Our objective is to describe and demonstrate a systematic method for extracting an argument 
from its written context and for evaluating it. We want a method which will apply to a wide 
range of both everyday and theoretical arguments and which will work for ordinary reasoning 
as expressed in natural language (and not just for those made-up examples with which logi-
cians usually deal). We also want a method which draws on the insights and lessons of clas-
sical logic where these are helpful, but which is non-formal and reasonably efficient (both re-
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quirements exclude a method which requires us to translate real arguments into the symbol-
ism of classical logic). Besides all this we want a method which is teachable and which com-
bats—to the proper extent—our tendency to rely on experts. (Fisher 1988: 128) 
Fisher’s method is clearly the kind of method that should interest us but we must narrow it 
down two times. First, we will leave aside the part of the method having to do with argu-
ment extraction, and concentrate on the method of argument evaluation. Argument evalua-
tion also has two parts since for an argument to establish its conclusion ‘its premisses must 
be true, … , and its conclusion must follow from its premisses’ (Fisher 1988: 130). It is the 
‘following-from’ part of argument evaluation that Fisher thinks constitutes ‘the big ques-
tion’ (ibid.) and also ‘the interesting question’ (Fisher 1988: 5), and it coincides exactly 
with what we are focussing on—illative questions.  Are there then methods of informal 
logic—methods of informal illative evaluation—just as there are methods of formal illative 
evaluation? Do informal logics have conceptual standards of illative evaluation? Do they 
have operational standards? Are there methods for determining whether the operational 
standards have been met, consisting of key informal concepts and informal techniques? 
 Consider the following extant approaches to argument evaluation in the informal 
logic literature: the fallacies approach, first suggested by Aristotle and developed by Copi 
(1961), and Johnson and Blair (1977); the deductivism approach, championed by Whate-
ly (1828) at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and still favoured by the brothers 
Groarke (1999, 2009); the logical analogies approach urged by Burbidge (1990); the ar-
gument schemes approach, much in favour recently, and developed by Douglas Walton 
(1996). There is also the approach using argument warrants, central to Mill’s logic 
(1843), and promoted by Toulmin (1958). Finally, there is something we might call ‘the 
thinking about it’ approach; it is the method advocated by Fisher (1988), and also by Pin-
to and Blair (1993), which involves thought experiments to see whether conclusions fol-
low from premises.  Although, for the most part, these approaches have not been present-
ed as full-blown methods, they include many of the nuts and bolts needed to reconfigure 
them as methods of illative evaluation. Let us see how far we can go with this.  
 We may begin by comparing a method built on Aristotle’s list of fallacies in the 
Sophistical Refutations with the truth-table method in formal logic. Aristotle’s fallacies 
are fallacies of following-from,
4
 so they can be part of a method of illative evaluation. 
The conceptual standard for formal logic is that of deductive validity. Aristotle has a 
narrower conceptual standard, that of syllogistic consequence: a conclusion follows from 
premises if, and only if, the premises necessitate the conclusion, the premises cause the 
conclusion and the conclusion is non-identical to any of the premises.
5
 The operational 
standard on the formal logic side will be that of truth-table validity whereas on the falla-
cies method it will be that of not committing any of the fallacies on the A-list (the inven-
tory of fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations). The test for the formal method is to de-
termine whether there are only T’s in the final column whereas on the fallacies method it 
is to determine whether the argument commits any of the fallacies on the A-list. The 
techniques involved on the formal side consists of making truth tables and computing the 
values of compound sentences. For the fallacies method the technique consists of careful-
ly reading the argument and then comparing it to each of the definitions that identify the 
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fallacies on the A-list, one-at-a-time. The concepts involved on the formal side are the 
basic concepts of propositional logic; on the informal side they are the component con-
cepts in ‘syllogistic validity’ and the definitions of the fallacies. 
 As a second illustration, let us consider a method based on argument schemes. 
What standard goes with that method? Walton offers this observation: 
Although the term valid does not seem to be quite the right word to use with many of these 
argumentation schemes, still, when they are rightly or appropriately used, it appears that they 
are meeting some kind of standard of correctness of use [my stress]. What is important to 
come to know is what this standard is, for the most common and widely used schemes espe-
cially, and how each of the schemes can be tested against this standard. (Walton 1996: 1) 
From the gist of his project it seems that Walton is proposing the following conceptual 
standard: an argument is illatively good if its premises (assuming they are acceptable) 
establish a presumption that its conclusion is acceptable. This we may dub the standard of 
‘presumptive validity’. What then might the relevant operational standard be?  The evalu-
ation of arguments, on the schemes method, is guided by the unique set of critical ques-
tions associated with each of the  schemes. These questions can be classified, some pertain-
ing to the acceptability of the premises, others to illative strength, and so on. In constructing 
an informal method of illative evaluation based on argument schemes, we restrict ourselves 
to the questions relating to illative strength. Let us then propose the following as an opera-
tional standard: an argument is presumptively valid if it satisfies the questions (pertaining 
to illative strength) associated with the scheme of which it is an instance. The concepts of 
the method are found in the schemes and the associated questions. Some of the questions 
are loaded with important concepts like ‘probable’, ‘plausible’, ‘consistent’, ‘commitment’, 
‘cause’ etc. The technique of the method will consist of fitting the NLA’s to schemes, ask-
ing the relevant questions, and evaluating the answers to the questions. 
 I think that, with some work, similar comparisons can be made for the other ap-
proaches to informal illative evaluation: logical analogies, warrantism, and the methods 
of thinking about it. That is, all the informal approaches mentioned above can be ana-
lysed in such a way that they emerge as having the shape of a method, complete with 
standards, tests, concepts and techniques—just like formal logic. 
4. ANALYSING AND COMPARING THE METHODS 
When stated, methods give us discussible procedures for dealing with difficult questions.  
They can be scrutinized, criticized, and possibly improved. If there is more than one 
method available to achieve a given end, the methods can be compared with each other. 
For illative methods, I propose to compare them under three different headings: the char-
acteristics of methods, the content of methods, and the functional adequacy of methods.  
4.1 Characteristics of methods 
Under ‘characteristics’ we may first identify the kind of standard a method embodies. Is it 
an ideal standard (like platonic forms) appropriate for evaluating argumentation? Or a 
precise standard such as deductive validity used to evaluate arguments by the deductive 
standard? Or a minimum standard, specifying that an argument is premiss sufficient if it 
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is at least up to a certain mark, like the standards of inductive and presumptive validity? 
Another aspect of the characteristics of methods is whether they are direct or indirect. 
Using schemes, or truth-tables, or warrants, seems to be a direct method of evaluation 
since no other arguments will be involved than the one being evaluated. The method of 
logical analogies, however, is an indirect method since it decides the illative value of an 
argument by comparing it to another argument whose illative value is given or assumed. 
One can also ask whether a method is polar or bipolar; that is, whether it is capable of 
giving both the result that arguments are illatively strong and the result that they are illa-
tively weak. The truth-table and schemes methods are bipolar, but natural deduction is 
not, nor is a method built on an incomplete list of fallacies. Finally, we ask whether a 
method can be used to give us judgments of intermediate illative strength. It seems that 
the method of formal logic cannot do this and neither can methods of fallacies, but a 
schemes method could, since it involves several questions of which some can receive a 
favourable answer and others not, and so, overall, we might conclude an argument is of 
intermediate strength. How methods can be compared under these headings just intro-
duced is displayed in the following chart. 
 Formal logic Fallacies (Copi) Logical analogy Schemes 
Standards Precise Precise & Minimum
6
 Precise Minimum 
Direct 
Direct  
(truth table) 
Direct Indirect Direct 
Polarity Bipolar 
Polar  
(negative) 
Polar  
(negative) 
Bipolar 
Intermediate 
judgments 
Not possible 
Not possible for  
some; possible  
for others 
Not possible Possible 
 
Table 1. Comparing the characteristics of methods 
4.2 Comparing the content of methods 
Methods can also be compared in terms of their content, by which I mean their operation-
al standards, concepts and techniques. The content of methods is what is especially im-
portant for the practical dimension of our inquiry. What the student assessors need is help 
with making judgments about premiss sufficiency. If they are left to their intuitions, we 
can expect their judgments to vary greatly and, moreover, not to be justified. Having con-
cepts, techniques, and standards tied together in a method, if that is possible, is a fix for 
both these problems. 
 Some of the points of contrast have already been noted, but a few further obser-
vations may be helpful. For the fallacies method, the concepts it employs are the defini-
tions of the fallacies, and the technique it uses is that of investigating arguments to see 
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whether they have committed a fallacy. As for deductivism—in one of its guises—the 
technique is to ‘reconstruct’ arguments such that they are deductively valid according to 
the semantic conception of validity, and then determine whether the newly added validi-
ty-making premiss is acceptable. The concepts then are those of ‘semantic validity’ and 
‘statement acceptability’. Fisher’s method of ‘thinking about it’ relies essentially on the 
concept of the ‘assertibility question’ and the notion of a ‘field’ or ‘subject of study’; the 
technique for his method is that of thought experiments. Interestingly, different tech-
niques ask different abilities of the argument assessors: all the methods require an ability 
to read and understand arguments carefully, but some methods require the ability to work 
with mathematical-like symbols, some require familiarity with the field to which the ar-
gument belongs, and some require the power of imagination. From this we may anticipate 
that some assessors will be better suited to some methods than to others.  
 Formal Logic  
method 
Fallacy method ‘Thinking about it’  
method 
Operational  
Standard 
An argument is 
premiss sufficient if 
it is truth-table valid. 
An argument is  
premiss sufficient  
if it commits none of 
the fallacies on the A-
list. 
An argument is premiss  
sufficient if, judging by  
appropriate standards of  
evidence, it is not possi-
ble that the premises are 
true and the conclusion is 
false. 
Concepts - truth functions;  
- truth-table validity. 
- identifying  
conditions of the  
fallacies on the A-list; 
- syllogistic validity 
- argument field; 
- assertibility question 
Techniques - constructing  
truth-tables;  
- computing value of 
compound sentences; 
- reading the results. 
- careful reading of 
argument;  
- comparing argument 
with each of the falla-
cies on the list 
- finding field-relative 
standard;  
- performing thought  
experiment 
Comment - mechanical. - requires  
interpretation 
- requires  
imagination 
 
Table 2. Comparing contents of methods 
4.3 Comparing the functional adequacy of the methods 
Let us now turn to the basis for comparing the functional adequacy of methods. Writing 
about argument cogency (her term for ‘argument goodness’) Trudy Govier makes the 
following observations: 
ARE THERE METHODS OF INFORMAL LOGIC? 
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An account of argument cogency is a reliable one if it can be used by different people to get 
the same result. Or, if there are variations in result, these are readily explicable in terms of 
pertinent background beliefs about the warrantedness of the premises. And it is efficient if it 
can be applied in a fairly uncumbersome way. (Govier 1999: 108 f.) 
I want to adapt these remarks, giving them a slightly different twist, so they can be ori-
ented toward the comparison of the adequacy of methods of illative evaluation. In addi-
tion to the two aspects mentioned by Govier, reliability and efficiency, I will add a third 
about the scope of methods.  
 Reliability. There are really two aspects of reliability. The one is given by Go-
vier: a method of testing for premiss sufficiency is reliable to the extent that ‘it can be 
used by different people to get the same result’. Govier’s suggestion is that if a group of 
assessors were to disagree about an argument’s cogency this would be explainable by the 
group-members having differing beliefs about the argument’s premises. But beliefs about 
premises is a premiss issue, not an illative one. Could not the assessors disagree about the 
illative strength of the argument even though they were in agreement about the premises? 
And, if so, might there not be some method to help them overcome their disagreement?  
 Considering the kind of project imagined above which involves working with a 
group of student assessors, we should say a bit more about the make-up of the group. We 
stipulate that it is a group made of either senior undergraduate students or MA level stu-
dents in the humanities or sciences; the group is an even mixture of men and women; the 
members are open minded and willing to revise their views following discussions, but they 
are not easily swayed. Importantly, no member of the group has undue influence over the 
opinions of the other members. The group of student argument assessors is competent in 
the language of the object arguments and they have neither learning disabilities nor idio-
syncracies that would keep them from correctly applying the methods they are taught. Giv-
en this characterization of the argument assessors we can put the reliability aspect in more 
definite terms. Assume that the several members of a group, G, have been well trained in 
how to use a method and that they are serious about argument evaluation, then, 
 A method, M, used by a group of student assessors, G, to test a set of NLA’s, A, 
for premiss sufficiency, is reliable to the extent that members of G using M cor-
rectly will agree in their illative evaluations of the members of A. 
We may call this the subjective reliability of an illative method. Subjective reliability will 
be a matter of degree: some methods may have a high level of subjective reliability, other 
methods a lower level.  
 The other way in which methods are reliable has to do with the actual results that 
they produce. It is possible that a method has a high degree of subjective reliability when 
rightly used—that assessors using the method tend to agree in their judgments—and yet 
that it sometimes or even frequently results in mistaken judgments, or even that it con-
sistently misjudges certain kinds of arguments. Polling methods that fare better at predict-
ing election winners are more reliable methods than those that aren’t right as often. Simi-
larly, of two methods of illative evaluation of NLA’s, the one that results in false posi-
tives or false negatives less frequently than another method is, other things being equal, 
the more reliable method. This we may call the objective reliability of a method. Both 
subjective and objective reliability are a matter of degree and illative methods will be 
HANS V. HANSEN 
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comparable, vis-à-vis each other for both kinds of reliability. (If the arguments that are ‘out 
there’ are such that they should not all be evaluated by the same standard of premiss suffi-
ciency, then it will be difficult for any single-standard method to be objectively reliable.) 
 Efficiency. An account of argument cogency is efficient to the extent that ‘it can 
be applied in a fairly uncumbersome way’, says Govier. Being cumbersome seems to be 
something we might also say about the employment of a method. Let us say that a meth-
od is learner-efficient to the extent that its content—its operational standard, concepts and 
techniques—can be learned fairly easily by our group of argument assessors.  Once 
learned, however, the method may not be easy to apply. Thus, not only is there a question 
of learner-efficiency, there is also a question of user-efficiency. That a method should be 
easy to learn and easy to use stems in part from the desideratum that all those with an 
interest in argument evaluation (which is, or should be, nearly everybody) should be able 
to use it. So, what is wanted is a method that is both learner- and user-efficient. However, 
one method might be easy to learn but hard to use, and another method, complex and 
technical, hard to learn, yet once learned, quite user-efficient. (Methods that are very dif-
ficult to learn and to use have a greater start-up cost than other methods, and that might 
be a reason for funded research not to prefer them.) 
 Scope. The more kinds of arguments a method can be used to evaluate, the greater 
is its scope, and the greater its scope the more useful the method is. Methods of truth-
functional logic cannot deal with relational arguments and for that reason we consider 
them, qua illative methods, to have narrower scope than methods that can deal with rela-
tional arguments as well. Deductive logic, in general, cannot deal with inductive argu-
ments, and so it has narrower scope than a method that can handle both deductive and in-
ductive arguments. In general, methods built on short inventories of fallacies or schemes 
will have narrower scope than those built on longer ones. Like reliability and efficiency, the 
scope of an illative method will be comparable to that of other methods. When an illative 
method is applied to arguments that lie outside its scope, objective reliability suffers. 
 Our knowledge of how functionally adequate—efficient and reliable—methods 
of illative evaluation are must await empirical investigation. Still, we can make some 
tentative guesses at how how things might work out. Formal logic has been criticized for 
being hard to learn which means it has low learner-efficiency and we can predict that its 
user-efficiency will vary with the complexity of the arguments being evaluated. We 
should expect a high level of subjective reliability among assessors who have learned the 
method; however, formal logic is criticized for not being applicable to the main body of 
NLA’s we meet in popular discourse because they aren’t ‘deductive arguments’; this im-
plies formal logic has restricted scope, and that as we try to apply it to the arguments to 
which it is not a natural fit, the objective reliability of the method decreases.  
 The method of ‘thinking about it’ is advertised as being learner and user-
efficient. True, it is not a hard method to learn, and Fisher thinks we can begin to use it 
even if we don’t really have a lot of familiarity with the subject matter. Still, it is harder 
to apply the method than it is to learn (understand) it. It is noteworthy that the method has 
no limitation in terms of scope: in principle it can be applied to any argument. However, 
this method’s subjective and objective reliability will depend on the field-relevant 
knowledge possessed by the assessors. What is needed for subjective reliability is that the 
assessors agree on the field-relative standards but, despite our requirement that they have 
about the same level of education, it is to be expected that agreement will often be hard to 
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come by, especially as the subject matter lies outside the common knowledge of the as-
sessors. For objective reliability what is needed is that the assessors have the correct 
field-relative standards, and that they can use their imaginations well. Objective reliabil-
ity will then depend on how good the fit is between the knowledge of the assessors and 
the subject matter of the arguments that will be examined.  
 Formal Logic ‘Thinking about it’ Argumentation schemes 
Learner 
efficiency 
LOW: difficult b/c 
of abstract nature; 
requires math-like 
skills 
HIGH: not concept 
heavy and hardly any 
technical concepts 
LOW TO MEDIUM: many 
schemes; even more  
associated questions; Qstns 
contain difficult concepts 
User  
efficiency 
This will DEPEND 
on the complexity 
of the argument 
MEDIUM: b/c it  
requires some 
knowledge of field 
relative standards 
MEDIUM TO HIGH: many  
arguments and schemes fit 
easily together 
Subjective 
reliability 
HIGH among those 
who have learned 
the method  
DEPENDS on extent of 
shared field-relative 
knowledge of asses-
sors; and parity of 
imaginative powers 
MEDIUM TO HIGH: b/c the 
questions will direct the  
assessors to consider the 
same issues 
Objective 
reliability 
LOW: b/c of  
limited scope 
DEPENDS on assessors 
identifying the correct 
field-relative stand-
ards; and powers of 
imagination  
MEDIUM: b/c of scope  
restrictions 
Scope NARROW: b/c 
works only for ar-
guments suited to 
be measured by the 
deductive standard 
WIDE: can be  
applied to all kinds  
of arguments  
MEDIUM: b/c restricted to 
presumptive reasoning (leav-
ing out deductive and induc-
tive); varies directly with the 
number of schemes in use 
 
Table 3. Comparing the adequacy of methods 
The method of argument schemes, although it is not formal or mathematical, does, never-
theless, take considerable effort to learn. This is because, if it is to have broad application, 
it must include many schemes (perhaps as many as 60) and their associated questions. So, 
we should judge it to have rather low learner-efficiency. Again, with a long list of schemes, 
the method may be cumbersome to employ, and hence its user-efficiency is hampered. The 
method may fare better in terms of subjective reliability because all the assessors will have 
to deal with the same critical questions, which will channel their attention in the same di-
rection which should facilitate agreement. The degree of objective reliability will be a func-
tion of how well the inventory of schemes matches up with the arguments that are ‘out 
there’; we should expect that the more comprehensive the list, the greater the objective reli-
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ability. (So, objective reliability is inversely related to efficiency.) The presentation of the 
schemes method currently being promoted by Walton is, however, restricted to those ar-
guments that are presumptively valid, leaving out arguments to be measured by the deduc-
tive and inductive standards, and this amounts to a scope limitation.  
 Let me repeat: these comparisons of functional adequacy are conjectures. They 
should be compared with other people’s intuitions, and they should be revised or dis-
missed in light of our empirical findings. 
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Some have suggested that the term ‘informal logic’ is an oxymoron, like ‘business eth-
ics’; it cannot both be logic and informal, they say. I disagree with this. But I also disa-
gree with those who think that informal logic should be a kind of argument evaluation or 
argumentation theory that includes judgments about premiss acceptability as well as other 
dialectical and rhetorical considerations. Logic is about making illative judgments, and 
these can be made with the aid of logical forms, or without them. Insofar as that they can 
be made without them, there is informal logic.  
 What started this inquiry was the question whether it would be more advanta-
geous to train a group of logiciners (logical novices), who were to be put to work evaluat-
ing natural language arguments, formal or informal methods of illative evaluation. Not 
enough has been found out for us to answer that question yet for, although it is true that 
formal logic has some shortcomings as a method of evaluating NLA’s, so too do each of 
the informal methods, and what is wanted is an overall evaluation. Nevertheless, a 
framework has been proposed that, in conjunction with empirical enquiry, can be used to 
eventually give us a basis for answering that question.  
 This inquiry brings with it some externalities. We have come to see that it is 
possible to recast some of the work that has been done in informal logic as methods of 
informal illative evaluation. There are three benefits to this observation. One of them is 
that it demarcates an area of investigation distinct from dialectical theory, rhetorical theo-
ry and epistemological theory. A second and related benefit is that informal illative eval-
uation is identified as an area of research. Projects can be designed to mark and define the 
concepts and techniques needed for each of the methods, and to formulate the needed 
operational standards and, in general, to improve the functional adequacy of the methods. 
Our increased concentration in this area will be a benefit to our students who want to 
learn to make justifiable illative judgments. The final boon, and not an insignificant one, 
is that we can now propose a new definition of ‘informal logic’. It is the set of methods of 
non-formal illative evaluation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The framework within which Hansen is working is clearly articulated, painstakingly delin-
eated, and systematically explored. Moreover, he has provided us with the kind of pro-
grammatic directions for future development that promise fruitful research to come. The 
result is a terrific new lens for looking at informal logic, one that brings important aspects 
of argument evaluation into focus. Informal logic provides us with a dazzling array of di-
verse insights and concepts and techniques and methods. Choosing and deploying the right 
tool in a specific situation is indeed an art. We need something to grab onto. Hansen’s ad-
vice—consider reliability, efficiency, and scope—is just the kind of handle that we need. 
 On the other hand, if we do follow his advice and restrict informal logic to the 
illative evaluation of arguments, it’s a handle that will elude our grasp. If we judge Han-
sen’s method for judging the methods of informal logic by the criteria he provides—
reliability, efficiency, and scope—it comes up short. 
 But, on yet another hand, the shortcomings are all connected to things that are 
missing from his analysis, which means that with friendly amendments, essentially just 
grafting on a patch, the project can be rescued. My criticism is only that it is incomplete, 
not that it is unworkable, incorrect, or misguided. On the contrary, it is none of those 
things, and I do not disagree with what he says. 
 Finally, on what I suppose must be the fourth hand, the addition requires that we 
expand the concept of informal logic to argument analysis in a very full sense, rather than 
restrict it, as Hansen proposes, to just evaluation of the inferential aspects or illative core, 
so I do disagree with that part of it. 
2. ARGUMENT IDENTIFICATION, EXTRACTION, AND REPRESENTATION 
Hansen‘s original scenario called for preparing graduate students to be sent out into the 
field to evaluate arguments concerning some controversy in the public sphere. The as-
sumption seems to be that arguments are discrete, identifiable, pre-packaged texts already 
out there just waiting to be collected and put under the microscope for analysis and eval-
uation. Arguments can indeed be found in the cacophonies that controversies generate, 
but there will also be a lot of other noise to deal with. Identifying what is and what is not 
an argument is no mean feat. The same can be said for extracting an argument from its 
dialogical context and putting it into a form appropriate for evaluation. For example, an 
adequate representation of an argument in the public sphere might have to bring together 
DANIEL H. COHEN 
2 
parts from several different sources, perhaps a series of editorial columns, letters to the 
editors, and replies. 
 Illative evaluation may well be the prime objective of the informal logic project, 
but it is a task that cannot even begin until arguments have been collected and presented 
for inspection. That involves three distinguishable, if not always discrete, activities, each 
requiring its own skill set. Arguments must be located; they must be isolated; and they 
must be readied for evaluation. 
 The first thing to do is simply locating arguments to be the subjects for evalua-
tion, but argument identification is not always a simple endeavour. Was that politician’s 
speech an argument for wind power or a rally for votes? Did she present one argument or 
two? Which parts of the speech were part of this argument, and which parts were serving 
other functions? I do not see any reasons for thinking that this crucial task does not 
properly fall within the purview of informal logic.  
 It is not enough, of course, just to recognize that, among other things, a text con-
tains an argument. The argument needs to be extracted from context because that context 
may include all sorts of thing that are neither part of nor relevant to the embedded argu-
ment. Was that witticism part of the column’s argument or just filler? Was the apparent 
digression germane or not? Are the carefully selected guests on the platform as the politi-
cian makes his case props for his argument? What of the flag pin on his lapel? It is one 
thing to recognize that there is an argument present, but it is quite another to pick out all 
of its pieces, and no others, from the buzzing, blooming confusion of the world.  
 Finally, there is the critical exercise of putting those pieces together. To cite an 
egregious case, imagine how great the effect on our illative evaluation of an argument can 
be if it is presented to us with a premise and the conclusion switched! An argument, once 
located and extracted, still needs to be assembled into a representation suitable for its 
assessment. Even the most reliable and efficient method of argument analysis operating 
within its intended scope cannot overcome the handicap of flawed input. 
3. EXPANDING THE SCOPE 
Arguments need to be tracked down and captured before they can be examined. My sug-
gestion, then, is that we have to add another criterion to the list of factors to consider in 
comparing the methods of informal logic, even just as methods of illative evaluation, viz., 
how well each method equips its practitioners to be “argument hunters.” This is not a 
trivial consideration. Consider what happens when students are first exposed to the falla-
cies approach to argument evaluation. They tend to see fallacies everywhere—in head-
lines, advertisements, casual conversation, and even jokes. An equivocation in a headline, 
however, is not a fallacy of equivocation if it is not part of an argument. Without an in-
ference, the ambiguity is just that, a grammatical error, a stylistic mis-step, or perhaps 
just a pun, but not a logical fallacy. If the fallacies approach actually makes the identifica-
tion task more difficult, that needs to be put on the balance scale. 
 We need to ask questions like these: Does thinking about arguments in terms of 
argument schemes help us in finding arguments? Alternatively, does the fallacies ap-
proach get in the way? If we think that arguments include backing and warrants, will that 
aid us in extracting arguments from public discourse? Will it serve us better than formal 
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logic in this regard? Is deductivism better than thinking-about-it for reconstructing argu-
ments from scattered pieces?  
 When Hansen asked us to imagine that we received a grant to study the argu-
mentation surrounding topic, he wrote, “Not only do you want to know what arguments 
have been given, you also want to know which ones are good arguments and which ones 
are not so good.” And then, after the graduate students were brought in, he set the stage 
for the rest of his paper, “You now have a practical problem: how do you prepare these 
people to help you with your research?” I would think that the first—and biggest, most 
important, and most helpful—job for such an “Arg Squad” would be the first part of the 
charge: finding out what arguments have been given. 
4. THE SCOPE OF INFORMAL LOGIC 
Let me re-emphasize that I think of this all as a friendly amendment to Hansen’s way of 
preparing for the main task of evaluating the illative strength of natural language argu-
ments. Hansen offers several factors to use in evaluating the different approaches to ar-
gument. I am suggesting one more. In addition to considerations of objective and subjec-
tive reliability, learner and user efficiency, and scope or range of arguments to which the 
methods in question apply, we ought to consider how comprehensive a method is with 
respect to the different stages and tasks involved in coming to an evaluation of the 
strength of a natural language argument. Among those tasks are locating, extracting, and 
presenting natural language arguments.  
 Admittedly, this friendly amendment may have some less-than-friendly conse-
quences. Let me end, then, with what I think should be five take-away points: 
 First, because the method for evaluating methods of illative evaluation cannot 
ignore argument identification and representation, informal logic cannot be restricted to 
just the evaluation of the illative component of natural language arguments. 
 Second, because natural language argument evaluation actually requires several dif-
ferent tasks, there might not be one single best method of informal logic, good for all occasions. 
 Third, the different tasks involve different skill sets, so there is good reason for 
informal logic instruction to include a variety of approaches to argument analysis. 
 Fourth, consequently, there is no informal logic algorithm to follow for analyz-
ing arguments. Informal logic is an art, not a science. 
 And finally, Hansen has raised an important question in an especially well-
focused way that deserves further input and elaboration from the argumentation theory 
and informal logic communities. 
